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THE (SELF) REGULATION OF LAW: A SYNERGISTIC MODEL
OF TORT LAW AND REGULATION
ANGUS CORBETT'
I INTRODUCTION
There appears to be a consensus that the law of negligence is out of balance.
There is a sense abroad that tort law in general, and the tort of negligence in
particular, has been allowed to drift into conflict with major social institutions,
including insurance markets, and with basic community values. A starting point
for the Panel appointed to review the law of negligence was that 'the present
state of the law imposes on people too great a burden to take care of others and
not enough of a burden to take care of themselves'. 1 This finds expression in
claims that the tort of negligence has become a form of social welfare, or that
somehow it has become associated with a form of 'strict liability'.2
A recent report on the insurance crisis made just this claim when it asserted
that one possible area of reform was to 'rewrite tort law to bring the standard of
negligence back to a reasonable person's approach, and away from strict
liability'.' There appears to be a general view that tort law is an institution in
society which needs to be reintegrated into the legal system to ensure that the
values it upholds accord with those of the 'broader community'.4 .
The perception that there is an uncontrolled expansion in tort law is wrong
and unhelpful. There are, of course immediate and practical problems caused by
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. An earlier draft of this article was
presented at the Research School of the Social Sciences - Law Program Seminar in May 2002.
Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law ofNegligence Final Report (2002) [1.24]. Many of the
Review of the Law ofNegligence Final Report's recommendations are proposed to be implemented in
the Civil Liability Amendment (personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW).
2 Chief Justice Spigelman, 'Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State' (2002) 76 Australian Law
Joumal432.
3 Geoff Atkins, Estelle Pearson and Peter Rose, Public Liability Insurance Analysis for Meeting of
Ministers 27 March 2002 (2002) Trowbridge Consulting, 45, <http://wwv.·.trowbridge.com.aul4A2568A
90009B04D/O/837DDIF7E6796A68CA256B95000A72AD/SFlLEIR]ublic+Liability+Fiua1.pdflOpeo
Element> at 14 November 2002.
4 See 'Tenns of Reference: Principles~Based Review of the Law of Negligence' , Panel of Eminent Persons,
above n 1, ix-xi. The Tenns of Reference state that '[tJhe av.'8l"d of damages for personal injU1)' has
become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured
through the fault ofanother'.
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the current trough in the insurance market and there seems little doubt that the
cost and/or availability of insurance is a problem for some, perhaps even broad,
sections of the community.' What I argue is that these problems are not in any
real sense 'caused' by tort law. Rather, they are the result of the interaction of a
broad matrix of institutional and legal concerns. These include changes in
regulation and in understandings of institutional responsibility, for example
expectations of markets, regulators and of significant public and private
institutions responsible for the delivery of goods and services in the community.
The problems generated by these institutional and regulatory changes should be
addressed with reference to this matrix of factors and not via a surrogate - tort
law.
The current focus on tort reform has three major consequences. First, some of
those injured, or who suffer loss, caused by 'negligent' conduct will receive less
or no compensation. This has distributional consequences, which affect those
injured and their families who often bear the ultimate responsibility of long-term
care for them. Secondly, the Commonwealth government will bear more of the
costs of injury as more people who would have recovered compensation fall
back onto the health care and social security systems.' Thirdly, the current focus
allows special interest groups such as insurers and industry groups to seek law
reform that will accrue to their benefit. This is in effect a form of rent-seeking,
which will not benefit the community as a whole.
The impacts of tort law reform will be real and important. They will not
however resolve the underlying concern in the community about the meaning of
concepts such as 'responsibility' - applied to either institutions or individuals.
This broader issue can only begin to be addressed if policy makers reject the
view that tort law reform can be used either to achieve particular public policy
outcomes or to alleviate particular social problems. In its place there needs to be
a consideration of how the law of torts interacts with other bodies of law to
produce particular outcomes.
This shift in focus is important because it requires an analysis of the way in
which bodies or categories of law interact to produce a system of law. In
particular it requires an analysis of how the legal system uses forms of self-
regulation to regulate the interaction between categories of law. This is the
question of how particular sets of rules in tort or contract or regulatory law
create a framework that regulates the interaction between these categories of
law.
The idea that the interaction between rules in tort law and rules in contract, or
between rules in tort law and rules in regulatory law, can establish a framework
for the operation of tort law is important for another reason. One of the signal
features of the current tort law reform debate is the view that tort law does not
appear to have an established framework or boundaries. It is not just that tort law
has breached its boundaries - it is almost as though there are no boundaries for
this category of law. This view seems to be supported by the difficulty that the
5 Atkins, Pearson and Rose, above n 3, 24-30.
6 See text accompanying on 116-18 below.
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High Court has had in providing any overarching set of principles to guide courts
and others in the application of tort law. It is this lack of an accepted framework
for tort .law that creates the space for broad ranging political discussion of the
role of tort. It is this space that Chief Justice Spigelman used to characterise tort
law as a 'last outpost' of the welfare state.'
The purpose of this article is to develop a multidimensional model describing
the interaction between tort law and other categories of law. The article is made
up of four parts. The first reviews the current, single-dimensional account of tort
law. By reviewing some recent developments in regulatory theory this part
shows why this model of tort is inadequate and why there is a need to develop a
more complex model of the way in which tort law is integrated into the legal
system. The second and third parts develop a multidimensional model of tort
law. In these parts I argue that there is a synergistic relationship between tort law
and regulation. The fourth and final part uses this synergistic model of tort law
to develop a critique of some of the major proposals for tort law reform. It also
sets out to show how to advance the debate about the appropriate form of tort
law reform.
n THE NEED FOR A NEW MODEL OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Much of the current debate about tort law implicitly adopts a one-dimensional
model of the legal system. The claim that tort law has adopted a form of 'strict
liability' and is out of balance with current community expectations is based
upon such an analysis. The proposition is that it is possible to analyse concepts
about responsibility as if tort law were the only body oflaw which has an impact
on the way that we understand this concept. This is the basis for the claim that
tort law reform will resolve the insurance crisis by pursuing the public policy
goal of insisting that individuals exercise greater levels of personal
responsibility.
A one-dimensional model of law is built around a particular view about the
construction of the legal system. It assumes that there are particular severable
categories of law (for example tort or contract or regulatory law) that can be
analysed as if they operate independently of each other. Within this model there
will be disputes about the appropriate boundaries of particular areas of law. The
search for boundaries is the search for a way of deciding which rule in which
category of law should take precedence and apply to a particular problem. It is
one-dimensional in the sense that it is the search for the particular category of
law that should supply the rule in the particular area where categories overlap.8
7 Spigelman, above n 2.
8 There is a vast body of literature dealing with these boundary concerns: see, eg, Hugh CaBins,
Regulating Contracts (1999) 41--6; Basil Markesinis and Simon Deak.in, Tort Law (4 th cd, 1998) 7-18,
113-18; John G Fleming, The Law a/Torts (9th 00,1998) 203-7. For an example ofjudicial reference to
these concerns, see Astley v Austrost Lld (1999) 197 CLR 1. See Harold Luntz and David Hambly, Torts
Cases and Commentary (5 th 00, 2002) [6.1.3] for a review of the commentary on the decision in this
case. See generally Peter Birks (ed), The Classification o/Obligations (1997).
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This is the foundation that supports the practice of analysing complex social
problems with reference to the structure of rules in a particular category oflaw.
Hugh Collins has developed a sustained critique of a one-dimensional model
of contract law:
Yet my argument has been that private law is undergoing a transformation in its
discourses. The chaoge in the pattern of private law reasoning has resulted. most
immediately from ao inevitable clash with the discourses of the economic aod social
regulation that were designed to address the inadequacies of private law as a form of
distributive regulation caused by its lack of differentiation between the social
contexts of contractual practices. The result of the collision between discourses has
been the reconfiguration of private law reasoning, so that instruroental or policy
concerns with its normative orientation become the dominant force for its
evolutionary trajectory.'
One of the themes developed by Collins is the notion that 'discourses of the
economic and social regulation' have affected the core content of the law of
contract. The law of contract and discourses of regulation have interacted to
reorient the law of contract toward different goals. It is this movement toward a
multidimensional account of private categories of law that this article seeks to
develop.
As Collins has argued, one of the primary challenges to categories of private
law, including tort law, is the ubiquity of regulation. Greater attention to the
problems of using regulation to achieve public policy outcomes has highlighted
the need for a better understanding of the legal system as a whole. There are two
ways in which the need for a better understanding of the legal system has
become apparent. .
On the one hand there ha.sbeen a movement away from predominantly direct
forms of regulation. The failure of these forms of regulation has highlighted the
complexity of the problem of deploying law to achieve public policy goals.!O In
general terms, direct forms of command and control regulation have often failed
to achieve expected outcomes. There are many reasons for this, including the
development of unnecessarily complex rules, over-regulation of activities, the
prevalence of 'creative compliance' and a lack of resources for regulatory
agencies to enforce the law. I! In simpler terms, the problems with command and
control regulation have reflected the problems associated with a one-dimensional
model of the legal system. On this basis the problem with command and control
regulation is that particular sets of regulatory laws implementing this form of
regulation have often been designed to operate as independent entities within the
broader legal system.
9 Collies, above n 8, 53.
10 See, eg, Gunther Teubner, 'Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions' in Robert Baldwin,
Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation (1998) 389, 406-14. Teubner argues
that '[t]he effect of regulatory law must be described in far more modest terms as the mere triggering of
selfregularory processes, the direction and effect of which can hardly be predicted' (emphasis in
original). For a practical example of the complexity of deploying law to achieve public policy goals, see
Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (1998).
11 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-regulation and Democracy (2002) 8-12. See
also Gunningham and Grabosky, above n 10, 5-11.
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On the other hand there is now broad agreement that there is no such thing as
an unregulated set of social practices.I' The idea of 'deregulation' was debunked
as it became clear that it was part of regulatory change and not the removal of
regulation. It involved both a change in the style of regulation, that is, the
rej ection of primary reliance. on direct regulation, and a change in the goals of
regulation. The preference given to the goal of establishing the conditions for
markets based on freedom of competition yielded to the need to recognise other
social, economic and political goals. 13
It is against this background that the concept of deregulation made space for
the development of more subtle, complex forms of self-regulation. This has
found expression in a renewed focus on the potential for self-regulation to
achieve public policy goals through a combination of direct and indirect
approaches to regulation. 14
One good example of the move to adopt more subtle, complex forms of self-
regulation is the introduction of the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth)
('FSRA'). This Act introduced a complex body of regulation dealing with the
financial services and markets. It includes provisions which, amongst other
things, establish financial markets, license fmancial service providers, set up
disclosure requirements for financial services licensees, and set out disclosure
requirements for financial product statements. IS The object of the FSRA is set out
in s 760A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This lengthy provision states that
the main object of chapter 7, which was substituted by the FSRA, is to promote:
(a) confident and infonned decision t;lllking by consumers of financial products
and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the
provision of those products and services; and
(b) fairness, honesty and professionalism by those who provide fmancial
services; and
(c) fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products ...
The fmancial services reform package introduced a complex collection of self-
regulatory mechanisms to regulate fmancial markets. The object of this body of
regulation is to balance a number of competing objects concerned with both the
efficiency and transparency of markets and confident and informed decision
making by consumers. This package of reforms stands in stark contrast to the
proposals for tort law reform. The approach to financial services regulation is
12 See, eg, Teubner, above n 10,416-20. Ai a minimum the market as a complex., self-regulating system
needs be supported by 'general rules to guarantee the basic conditions of freedom of competition': at
419. This requires the 'absolute primacy of competition over other eonomic, social and political goals';
at 419-20.
13 For a very influential account of this change see lan Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) 3-18. See also Gunningham and Grabosky, above n 10,
5-11 and Colin Scon, 'Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design'
[2001] Public Law 329.
14 See, eg, Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation, Industry Self-Regulation in Consumer Markets Report
(2000) <bttp://www.selfregulation.gov.aulpublicationsfTaskForceOnIndustrySelf-RegulatioIllFinalReport
!contents.asp> at 14 November 2002. 'The Government has an objective of lowering regulatory costs on
business and improving market outcomes for consumers, by encouraging self-regulation, where this is
the most effective option for addressing an identified problem': Executive Summary.
15 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 7608 ('Outline of Chapter').
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pluralistic and complex. The high standards of conduct expected of market
participants and the rights given to consumers to claim compensation for
misleading or deceptive conduct are not treated as a form of 'social welfare' .16
One approach which regulatory theorists have developed in order to refine our
understanding of the complexity of regulation is the concept of 'regulatory
space'. One theorist has explained the notion of regulatory space in the following
way:
The chief idea of the regulatory space metal?hor is that resources relevant to holding
of regulatory power and exercising capacilles are dispersed and fragmented. These
resources are not restricted to formal, state authority derived from legislation or
contracts, but also include information, wealth and organisational capacities. The
possession of these resources is fragmented among state bodies, and between state
and non-state bodies. The combination of information and organisational capacities
may give to a regulated finn considerable informal authority, which is important in
the outcome even of formal rule formation or rule enforcement processes. Put
another way, capacities derived from the possession of key resources are not
necessarilr exercised hierarchically within the regulatory space, regulator over
regulatee. 7
The characteristic feature of 'regulatory space' is the dispersal of 'regulatory
resources' _ information, authority, and organisational capacities. This has
resulted in the development of a wide range of strategies to achieve public
outcomes. These strategies have included novel approaches to the process of
standard setting, enforcement and monitoring and to the range of sanctions
available for regulatory breach.18
The development of this more subtle understanding of the problems of
regulation has however profoundly affected our understanding of the legal
system. A one-dimensional model of the legal system provides little insight into
the web of law surrounding and supporting relationships, which are the targets of
regulation. The formal set of rules seeking to regulate conduct jostles alongside a
range of bodies of law, which help to support relationships between those
engaged in the relevant conduct. A body of regulatory law will have to be
integrated with basic law of contract, tort, elements of public law and corporate
law, to mention only some. 19
The challenge created by these new approaches to regulation is to develop a
framework for describing the operation of the legal system?O It is no longer
enough to describe the outlines of particular categories of law such as tort or
16 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1041H-1. See Spigelman, above n 2, for reference to negligence as a
form of 'social welfare'.
17 Scatt, above D 13,330.
18 See generally ibid; Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 13; Parker, above nIl; and GUIUlingham and
Grabosky, above n 10. In relation to the sanctions in regulation, see Australian Law Reform Commission,
Securing Compliance: Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australian Federal Regulation, Discussion
Paper No 65 (2002).
19 See, eg, Parker, above n-l1, 57--{)1. 'A model for corporate social responsiveness' describes the process
by which organisations can integrate public policy goals into their own governance structures. This
process embeds regulation into the matrix of laws and practices, which support the capacity of
organisations to make this change.
20 This is the broad project pursued by Collins, above n 8, 53-5. The process by which the law of contract
integrates economic and social regulation is described as 'productive disintegration' .
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corporate law. It is necessary to describe ways in which these categories interact
to produce a 'system' of law. It is only in this way that it is possible to begin to
gain an understanding of how the full cross-section ofparticular laws will affect,
and be affected by, the conduct which public policy makers are seeking to
regulate. A better model of the legal system will not, by itself, help policy
makers resolve !Ill, or even the biggest, regulatory problems. Equally though, it is
clear that without a better model of the legal system these regulatory problems
will be sigoificantly harder both to defme and resolve.
A Framing the Outlines of a 'Synergistic' Model of Tort
The tort of negligence has the appearance of a sprawling empire that continues
to expand throughout the legal system and across all sectors of society2' There
are some, following this metaphor, who would argue that this particular empire
is crumbling in upon itself. On the one hand it is unable to sustain itself because
its rules and principles are simply too ambiguous and vague to provide sufficient
guides for conduct.22 On the other hand there is no coherent rationale or
principle which binds together the very broad range of relationships where tort
has established a presence.23 In simple terms, the tort has expanded too far and
lacks the glue that would bind the particular instances in which it applies into
any coherent body of law.
On one view this is an inherent feature of the tort of negligence. This tort is a
category of law characterised by an iterative process of reasoning. This process
of reasoning moves from particular cases to general principles through a process
of inductive reasoning. It was this process of reasoning Lord Atkin used to
generate the 'neighbour' principle in Donoghue v Stevenson. 24 The general
principle is then applied to specific sets of facts through a process of deductive
reasoning. This stage of the process involves the assertion that wherever there is
a 'neighbour' relationship there will be a duty of care. In Donoghue v Stevenson,
once the relationship could be described as a neighbour relationship there was a
basis for finding that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care. It is this
process of reasoning which has supported the expansion of the tort of negligence
to new kinds of relationships.
21 See, eg, Hill (tlas RP Hill & A.ssoc) v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 223 (the potential for supplanting
by the tort ofnegligence ofother established principle).
22 Perre v Apand Pty Lld (1999) 198 CLR 180, 215-16 (McHugh J outlining the importance of
predictability in the law of negligence). See generally Martin Davies, 'Conunon Law Liability of
Statutory Authorities: Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee' (2000) 8 Torts Law Journal
133 (the difficulties encountered by the High Court in formulating the approach to deciding upon the
existence of a duty of care).
23 Spigelman, above n 2, 434 ('The traditional function of the law of negligence ... of distributing losses
that are the inevitable by-product of modem living ... appears to have reached defmite limits as to what
society is prepared to bear'). See also 'Tenus of Reference: Principles-Based Review of the Law of
Negligence', Panel of Eminent Persons, above nI, ix-xi; Luntz and Hambly, above D 8, 19-20 (Lisle v
Brice (2001) 34 MVR 206, [4)-[5] (Thomas JA), commenting on the development ofa 'blame-conscious
community').
24 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.
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The problem with this iterative process of reasoning is that it is at once too
open and too closed. On the one hand the neighbour principle is just too
'opaque '25 to provide any secure indication of when the tort of negligence should
extend its coverage by recognising a duty of care26 On the other hand navigating
through a wilderness of particular instances in negligence without any guiding
principle has also proven to be unsatisfactory. In recent times the judges of the
High Court have recognised the limitations of 'incrementalism' as a form of
reasoning in negligence2 ?
The dichotomy between principles that are too general and empty and rules
that are too specific and unprincipled appears to confmn a view that the tort of
negligence cannot be dynamic, flexible and principled. However, the tort of
negligence is only caught in this dichotomy so long as the interaction between
the tort of negligence and other bodies of law is ignored. A multidimensional
model of tort law focuses on the way that values and policies which are part of
other areas of law, such as contract law and regulatory law, are integrated into
the rules and principles that mark out where the tort of negligence will apply and
where it will not.
A 'synergistic '28 model of the tort of negligence is a particular way of
developing a multidimensional model of tort law.29 It provides a way of showing
how the tort of negligence can combine with other categories of law in a way
that allows each to function synergistically with the other. A synergistic model
of tort law is founded on two steps in the process of reasoning to decide upon the
existence of a duty to exercise reasonable care. Both of these steps are a
ubiquitous and well-recognised part of the process of reasoning in tort law.
B The Space Occupied by Negligence
There are few who would disagree with Lord Atkin's basic proposition in
Donoghue v Stevenson that the neighbour principle embodies elements which are
common to all instances in which there is a duty to exercise care in negligence.3D
25 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 416--18.
26 Ibid 416-19 (Kirby J, review of approaches taken to ascertaining a duty of care). See also Sullivan v
Moody (2001) 183 ALR 404, 414 (the Full Court used a similar argument to criticise the use of
proximity as a criterion of the existence ofa duty of care).
27 The 'incremental approach' proposed by McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180,
217-18 was rejected by other members of the High Court, eg, at 253-4 (Gummow J stated that
incremental reasoning suffers from a 'temporal defect'), at 273-5 (Kirby 1), 302 (Hayne 1), at 325-6
(Callinan J argued that the law should develop incrementally). Where incrementalism becomes a fonn of
'gradualism' there is a risk that tort reasoning will stagnate. For an argument that McHugh J adopts a
form of incrementalism founded in principle and policy, see Prue Vines, 'The Needle in the Haystack:
Principle in the Duty of Care in Negligence' (2000) 23 University ofNew South Wales Law Journal 35,
38-42,47-55.
28 The idea of calling this model a 'synergistic' model draws on Chief Justice Gleeson's description of the
relationship between statute law and common law as 'symbiotic' in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council
(2001) 206 CLR 512, 532.
29 For an example of multidimensional analysis of negligence that begins by providing an account of what
judges do. see Jane Stapleton, 'Duty of Care: A Selection from the Judicial Menus' in Peter Cane and
Jane Stapleton (eds), The Law ofObligations: Essays in Celebration ofJohn Fleming (1998) 59.
30 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 579-80.
624 UNSW Law Journol Volume 25(3)
The neighbom principle embodies the concept of mutual interdependence. On
the one hand the defendant knows that their conduct has the potential to cause
harm and that they are able to reduce the risk of such harm by the exercise of
reasonable care. On the other hand the defendant's knowledge will be balanced
by an expectation from the plaintiff(s) that the defendant will exercise
reasonable care in these circumstances. Although it is more common to focus
attention on the defendant's knowledge there is no doubt that the very idea of a
'neighbour' embodies the idea of expectations as well as obligations.
The first step in developing an understanding of a synergistic model of
negligence is that neighbom relationships, characterised by relationships of
mutual interdependence, do not come into existence because of the operation of
the law of tort. Relationships of mutual interdependence are not created by rules
in tort law that specifY that a neighbour relationship is one where harm to the
plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's acts or
omissions.
Rather, these relationships are the incidental result of the interaction between
particular social practices and the bodies of law that support those practices. The
space that is occupied by the tort of negligence is therefore created and marked
out by the interaction between those social practices and their associated bodies
of law. Further, the values and public policy choices, which support those social
practices, are the result of private and public decision making that find
expression in contract or in particular areas of regulatory law. In this sense there
is simply no need for the judges deciding upon the existence of a duty of care in
the tort of negligence to decide whether these values and public policy choices
are either good or bad. They are simply the points of reference used to map out
the space occupied by the tort of negligence.
In this context, the role of the 'tests' used to determine whether in a particular
instance a defendant owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
plaintiff from sustaining harm is not to specifY preconditions for deciding when
a duty of care will come into existence. Rather, one of the roles of these tests is
to explore particular kinds of relationships to decide whether there is space for
the tort of negligence to occupy. This involves analysing whether particular
relationships have the characteristics of mutual interdependence that are a
necessary but insufficient condition for the recognition of a duty of care.
The process of reasoning in Donoghue v Stevenson is a good example of this
point3 ! The relationship of mutual interdependence between the manufacturer
and Mrs Donoghue in this case was a consequence of the commodification of
food products. By the time of the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson it was
.possible for manufacturers to expand their markets by manufacturing packaged
food that could be distributed under a recognisable brand name to consumers
through a range of retailers and intermediaries. As a result the manufacturer no
longer had a contractual relationship with either the pmchaser or the ultimate
consumer - though both the manufacturer and the consumer were involved in a
mutually interdependent relationship in which the manufacturer needed to
3! Ibid562-3.
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mutually interdependent relationship in which the manufacturer needed to
establish a relationship of trust with the consumer so that the consumer would be
able to rely on the quality of the product being manufactured. The law of
contract supported this new fonn of manufacturing and marketing by creating the
respective linkages between the manufacturer and retailer and retailer and
purchaser32
In this sense the relationship of mutual interdependence between the ultimate
consumer and the manufacturer was supported by, and indeed created by, the
operation of the law of contract. It was the contractual relationships between the
manufacturer and the retailer, and the retailer and the purchaser, which marked
out the potential neighbour relationship between the manufacturer and the
ultimate consumer. The space for the tort of negligence to occupy was hence the
combined result of the practice of commodification of food and the law of
contract that supported this new social practice.
One of the functions of the neighbour principle in Lord Atkin's judgment in
Donoghue v Stevenson was to allow Lord Atkin to explore the relationships
between the manufacturer, the purchaser and the ultimate consumer to determine
whether there was space for the tort of negligence to occupy. The neighbour
principle allowed Lord Atkin to consider whether the relationship between
manufacturer and ultimate consumer was the kind of mutually interdependent
relationship which could support the existence of a duty of care33 In later
portions of his judgment, Lord Atkin addressed the question whether the tort of
negligence should occupy this space34
This first step in developing a synergistic model of negligence is important for
two reasons. Firstly, it sometimes appears as though the recognition of a duty of
care involves the imposition of a relationship of responsibility upon the parties.
It is as if the operation of the tort of negligence is the result of courts making
public policy choices, which impose values and responsibilities on the parties
that are illegitimate because the decision is made by an unelected judge. In this
sense the values and public policy underlying the decision to impose the duty of
care are not the result of either private decision making or of a legislative
process that is designed to make public policy choices. This has led to an
extensive debate about whether it is appropriate for courts, rather than
legislatures, to make these choices.35
32 The process of development of new markets has been described as a form of commodification. This
process of commodification has been at times a site of significant political dispute as broadly based
popular movements sought to resist these developments: see Ben Maddison, 'Reification and
Commodification: Popular Anti-Market Discourse in Australia 1917·1924' (2001) 8 Bridges: An
Interdisciplinary Journal a/Theology, Philosophy, History and Science 143.
33 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 578-83.
34 !bid 583-99.
35 See, eg, Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512,532-7 (Gleeson Cl, arguing that the
decision to abolish the non-feasance rule for highway authorities should be left to Parliament). See also
State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwe/l (1979) 142 CLR 617. By contrast the majority in
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 547, identified a range of factors in deciding to
abolish the non-feasance rule for highway authorities. Gaudron, McHugb and Gumrnow JJ argued that
'the powers vested by statute in a public authority may give it such a significant and special measure of
control over the safety of the person or property of citizens so as to impose upon the authority a duty of
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By contrast, a synergistic model of tort law suggests that the space occupied
by the tort of negligence is marked out by the operation of bodies oflaw that are
the result of either public or private contractual processes of decision making. In
effect this means that neighbour type relationships are generated by the operation
of either regulatory law or systems of private governance. In deciding whether
the tort of negligence should colonise these spaces, courts are therefore able to
accept or adopt the public policy choices that are inherent in the bodies of law
which create neighbour type relationships. The issue for the law of negligence is
to determine the criteria for deciding whether any particular relationships,
characterised by relations of mutual interdependence, should give rise to a duty
of care.
The second reason that this point is important is that it helps establish the
framework within which the tort of negligence operates. One of the central
conundrums in this tort is the ambiguity of the control factors defining the reach
of the duty of care. The recognition that the problem for the tort of negligence is
one of recognising relationships of mutual interdependence gives ambiguity in
duty of care reasoning an important function. It is this ambiguity that ensures
that the tort of negligence retains the capacity to recognise mutually
interdependent relationships, which result from the interaction of new social
practices and the bodies of law regulating and supporting those social practices.
This is arguably the most important legacy of Donoghue v Stevenson, for without
it the tort of negligence would ossify around a determinate set of relationships
that play an increasingly marginal role in the community.
C A Synergistic Model of Negligence
The second step supporting a synergistic model of the tort of negligence is
also a familiar one. The decision to recognise a duty of care is the decision as to
whether the tort of negligence should fill the space marked out by the interaction
between social practices and the bodies of law supporting those practices. The
issue is one of whether any particular relationship, which is characterised by a
relationship of mutual interdependence, should also support a duty of care. This
is the point at which tort law appears to be most controversial.
The central feature of a synergistic model of tort law is that this decision is
based upon the interaction between two sets of concerns. On the one hand there
is a judgment about whether the particular relationship of mutual
interdependence 'fits' existing categories of duty of care in tort. This involves an
analysis of the central principles of tort law as they are expressed in prior
Australia without any 'proper regard 10 AU~lralian statutory contexts': at 602. in this sense it is the
position of the public authority which creates the space for the tort ofnegligen<.:e 10 occupy.
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cases. J6 On the other hand there is an assessment as to whether the recognition of
a duty of care would either enhance, or at least not detract from, the objects of
the bodies of law regulating the relevant social practices. This means that a
decision to recognise a duty of care is based on an internal analysis of whether
such a decision is consistent with the principles of tort law and with an external
assessment of the fit between tort law and the other bodies of law regulating the
conduct in question. J7
This model of tort law, which is based on the idea that negligence facilitates
the operation of complex bodies of law regulating social practices, significantly
undercuts many claims about the imperial march of the tort of negligence.J8 If
the decision to recognise a duty of care is significantly affected by an assessment
of whether the duty will enhance the objects of a system of law regulating
particular social conduct, the tort of negligence is adopting public policy choices
made elsewhere in the legal system. As a body of law it has an important role in
establishing synergistic linkages between segmented parts of the legal system. It
identifies relationships of mutual interdependence, which are created by the
impact of private decision making and regulation. It facilitates and supports the
existence of the relevant social practices and the operation of the bodies of law
regulating those practices.
This form of reasoning represents a ubiquitous part of the tort ofnegligence.39
The failure to recognise it results partly from the adoption of a one-dimensional
model of the legal system. If the starting point is that the body of law called the
36 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512,547. In deciding to abolish the non~feasance rule
and apply the ordinary duty of care in negligence to highway authorities, Gaudron, McHugh and
Gummow JJ considered various problems with the non·feasance rule. These included the 'unprincipled
distinctions' created by the rule, the 'unsatisfactory dichotomy between misfeasance and non-feasance',
the role of precedent, clarification of the distinction between negligence and nuisance, and the statutory
context in New South Wales for the existence of the 'immunity'. Kirby J identified a similar range of
factors: at 600-4.
37 See below Part ID; see, eg, Sullivan v Moody (2001) 183 ALR 404, 417. The Full Court explicitly
considered the impact of the finding of a duty of care upon the regulatory scheme that was designed to
protect children. The Coun argued that
[i]t would be inconsistent with the proper and effective discharge of those duties should they [the
defendant medical practitioner and social workers] be subjected to a legal duty, breach of which
would sound in damages, to take care to protect persons who were suspected of being the sources of
that harm.
This approach to deciding upon the existence of a duty of care was also used in Tame v New South Wales
(2002) 191 ALR 449, 457-8 (Gleeson Cl). 463 (Gaudron J), 478-9 (McHugh J), 507 (Gummow and
Kirby JJ), 525 (Hayne J), 534-5 (Callinan J). For an example of the application of this process of
reasoning by an intermediate court of appeal, see New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235
(Unreported, Spigelman CJ, Mason P and Giles JA, 19 July 2002) [86]-[96] (an example of the
application of this 'coherence of the law' approach to a novel duty of care case involving a complex
scheme of regulation). For a further very explicit example of this form of reasoning see, Lynch v Lynch
(by her tutor Lynch) (1991)25 NSWLR 411.
38 David Partlen, 'Economic Loss and the Limits of Negligence' (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 64, 75-
7 (recovery in tort facilitates development of cooperative behaviour).
39 See, eg, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 582-3. Lord Atkin explicitly considers the impact of the
recognition of a duty of care on the broad pattern of contractual relationships supporting the
manufacture, marketing and consumption of ginger beer by a manufacturer, which distributes product to
a consumer via intermediaries.
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tort of negligence is an independent actor in the legal system, its facilitative role
will not be evident. It is only by acknowledging that the tort of negligence is
integrated into a number of different dimensions of the legal system that its
facilitative role becomes evident.
III A SYNERGISTIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC LOSS
The law relating to the recovery of pure economic loss in negligence is a
particular instance of some of the broader problems encountered elsewhere in the
tort of negligence. There appears to be a combination of indeterminate and
empty rules that lack any coherent rationale to support the existence of the right
to recover pure economic loss in negligence. For example Harold Luntz and
David Hambly argue that, apart from the test of reasonable foreseeability, 'lilt is
not easy to ascertain from the lengthy judgments in these and other cases what
are the other factors that will determine the existence of a duty of care. '40
Similarly, there is a lack of agreement on the rationale supporting the right to
recover pure economic loss in negligence. Broad debate takes place about
particular cases without reaching agreement about the underlying rationale for
allowing recovery for pure economic loss. There are however a range of attempts
to provide a principled explanation of why plaintiffs should be able to recover
pure economic loss in negligence and how this right fits around remedies in
contract law and sanctions and remedies found in systems of law regulating
particular activities4 !
The combination of ambiguity in the legal principles governing the right to
recover pure economic loss with the lack of any coherent rationale for the
existence of this right creates the impression of a body of rules operating outside
any accepted framework, generating a body of law that is both unstable and
unpredictable.
This conjunction of ambiguity and lack of overall coherence is in one sense
particular to the body of rules dealing with the right to recover for pure
economic loss. In another sense, though, this state of affairs is a metaphor for
tort law more generally. The combination of ambiguity and lack of overall
40 Luntz and Hambly, above n 8, 848-9. The cases referred to in this quote include Esanda Finance
Corporation Lld v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (Reg) (1997) 188 CLR 241, Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188
CLR 159, Perre v Apand Ply Lld (1999) 198 CLR 180.
41 See, eg, Peter Cane, 'The Blight of Economic Loss: Is There Life after Perre v Apand?' (2000) 8 Torts
Law Journal 246; Bruce Feldthusen, 'Liability for Pure Economic Loss: Yes, But Why?' (1999) 28
University of Western Australia Law Review 84 (an example of an attempt to provide a coherent
rationale for the right to recover pure economic loss in negligence); Bruce Feldthusen, 'Pure Economic
Loss in the High Court of Australia; Reinventing the Square Wheel' (2000) 8 Tort Law Review 33;
Partlen, above n 38, 76--7 (law relating to recovery of pure economic loss 'perfonns a facilitative role in
a relational setting'); Angus Corbett, 'The Rationale for the Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in
Negligence and the Problem of Auditors' Liability' (1994) 19 Melbourne Universify Law Review 814 (a
review of the rationale for the recovel)' of pure economic loss), See also Markesinis and Deakin, above n
8, 35-7 (an example of the difficulties in conducting an economic analysis of the decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court in Canadian National Railway Co \' Norsk Pac{fic Steamship Co Lld [1992J I
SCR 102!)
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coherence has produced the space which is now being filled by proposals for tort
law reform. This space is being filled with proposals that are based on the need
to reassert the importance of people accepting more responsibility to care for
themselves with less reliance on the right to seek compensation from others'2
By contrast, a synergistic model of tort law provides an account of how the
framework supporting the law of tort is the product of the interaction between
tort law and other bodies of law. The following analysis of Perre v Apand Pty
Lld (,Perre v Apand')43 is an example of how a synergistic model of tort can
provide an account of the framework that gives structure to the law relating to
the recovery of pure economic loss in negligence.
A Perre v Apalld Pty Lld
Gleeson CJ summarised the facts of Perre v Apand in 'broadest outline' in the
following way:
In a rural locality in South Australia, a number of farmers grew potatoes, some for
export to Western Australia. The respondent ['Apand'] negligently introduced a
form of disease, known as bacterial wilt, on to the land of one farmer. The Western
Australian regulations imposed a prohibition on the importation into Western
Australia; not only of potatoes grown on land known to be affected by the disease,
but also of potatoes grown on land within a certain distance of affected land. The
appellants ['the Perre interests'] were involved, in various ways, in potato growing
on such land, and claimed to suffer financialloss.44
The claim by the Perre interests was that, as a result of the conduct of Apand,
the regulation, disallowing sale in Western Australia of potatoes grown within
20 kilometres of any farm where diseased potatoes had been found, prevented
them from selling their potatoes in Western Australia.45 This resulted in pure
economic loss in the form of a loss of opportunity to sell their product into
Western Australia at a price that was higher than they were able to obtain in
South Australia. The primary issue in this case was whether Apand, who brought
the diseased seed on to the land of one farmer, owed a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the Perre interests from sustaining these financial
losses.
Ultimately the Court decided that Apand, the person responsible for
introducing the diseased seed, did owe a duty of care to either some,46 or all of
the Perre interests.47 The Perre interests, personally and through interposed
companies and other legal entities, either grew or processed potatoes within 20
42 Spigelman, above n 2.
43 (1999) 198 CLR 180.
44 Ibid 191.
45 Plant Diseases Regulations 1989 (WA) r 4(1), 5ch 1, pt 8, item 14{l )(b).
46 Perre \' Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 233-5 (McHugh J included those Perre interests growing potatoes
for export to Western Australia, but excluded those who processed potatoes for sale to Western
Australia), 308 (Hayne J included only those directly affected by the 20 kilometre rule, that is, only those
growing and processing potatoes intended for sale in Western Australia).
47 Ibid 259-61 (Gummow J included all the 'components of the Perre business' that could establish that
they had sustained damage), 291-2 (Kirby J included all 'members of the integrated commercial
operalion'), 329 (Callinan J included all Perre interests subject 10 proof and assessmenl of damages).
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kilometres of the farm on to which Apand brought the diseased seed. The effect
of this decision appears to be that it is possible for a defendant to owe a duty of
care to a determinate class of plaintiffs - even where the defendant had no
relationship with these plaintiffs and no specific knowledge of their activities.
On the face of it this appeared to be an extension of the principles outlined in a
number of cases which had required either a direct relationship with the plaintiff
or some specific knowledge of the particular risk which the defendant's conduct
imposed on the plaintiff.48
B The Problem In Perre v Apand
There is a problem of deciding whether or not the decision in Pare v Apand
involved an extension of the circumstances giving rise to a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent damage in the form of pure economic loss. There is a
second issue as to whether or not this extension of the range of the duty of care,
if there was such an extension, can be justified. A third issue, whether the
process of reasoning in Pare v Apand makes the application of the law of
negligence in the area of recovery for pure economic loss more or less
predictable, is also important.
On the basis of the processes of reasoning used by the seven judges in their
separate judgments these are difficult questions to answer. On the one hand there
was no agreement between the justices on the process for deciding novel duty of
care questions. The different approaches taken by each of the justices have been
mapped by a number of authors" On the other hand there was a significant
degree of agreement on the 'salient features' of the relationship between the
Perre interests and Apand which supported the recognition of a duty of care.'o
These features included the finding that the Perre interests were members of a
clearly identifiable class, that Apand understood the impact of the 20 kilometre
rule, that Apand had decided for its own commercial reasons to carry out an
experiment which involved the introduction on to the Sparnon farm of
uncertified seed, and that the Perre interests sustained harm as a result of a
decision by Apand over which they had no control. In more abstract terms,
Apand had control over the risks of harm to which the Perre interests were
exposed and the Perre interests were exposed to a risk of harm without their
knowledge and were without any opportunity to protect themselves.51 There was
no agreement or explanation as to why these factors were salient or why they
justified the recognition of duty of care.
48 Cabex Oil (Australia) Pty Lld v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529; Hill v Van Erp (1997)
188 CLR 159.
49 Adrian Baron, 'The "Mystery" of Negligence and Economic Loss: When is a Duty of Care Owed?'
(2000) 19 Australian Bar Revie»' 167, 183-91; Jim Davis, 'Liability for Careless Acts or Omissions
Causing Purely Economic Loss: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd' (2000) 8 Tor' Law Journal 123, 125-9; Jane
Swanton and Barbara McDonald, 'Liability in Negligence for Pure Economic Loss' (2000) 74 Australian
Law Journal J7.
50 Baron, above n 49, 188; Davis, above n 49, 129-30; Swanton and McDonald above n 49, 20-2.
51 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 194-5 (Gleeson Cl), 20J-2 (Gaudron 1), 233-6 (McHugh 1), 255-
61 (Gumma\\' 1),286--91 (Kirby 1).303-8 (Hayne J), 326-31 (Callinan J).
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C Application of the Synergistic Model
An account of the process of reasoning based upon a synergistic model of
negligence provides a different method of addressing the problems in Perre v
Apand. A synergistic model invites consideration of two sets of issues. The first
is whether the regulatory and statutory structure creates space for the tort of
negligence to occupy. There are a number of indicators of where a body of law
does create a space for negligence. One indicator will be whether the system of
regulation creates mutually interdependent relationships. Another indicator will
be whether the regulatory scheme seeks to allocate risks generated by this
relationship between the relevant parties.
The second set of issues concerns the broad question about whether the tort of
negligence should occupy the space created by the regulatory scheme. This issue
requires analysis of the internal 'fit' of a decision to recognise a duty of care.
Does the recognition of a duty of care share sufficient common features with
prior decisions or does it represent a rupture in the continuity of the law? It also
requires analysis of whether the decision to recognise a duty of care 'fits' the
external regulatory environment. Does the recognition of a duty of care enhance
or detract from the capacity of the regulatory regime to achieve its goals and
objectives?
An account of the process of reasoning based upon this model of tort law
suggests some determinate answers to the questions about the impact of the
decision in Perre v Apand. It would suggest that there was a real issue as to
whether the context of the relationship between the Perre interests and Apand
created space for the tort of negligence to occupy. The application of negligence
to this new form of social conduct did involve a degree of novelty and
unpredictability. It would also suggest that the process of reasoning about the
relevance of the 'salient features' was less casual and more structured than the
judgments otherwise indicate. Finally it would indicate that the meta-analysis of
the process for deciding upon novel applications of the duty of care was
unproductive.
The most important element of this account of the decision in Perre v Apand
is the claim that the process of reasoning used to decide upon the relevance of
the 'salient features' was carried on by the judges within a determinate
framework. The next step in establishing the outlines of this is to review the
system regulating agricultural product markets.
D The Regulation of Commodity Markets
The growing and marketing of agricultural commodities is the context for the
decision in Perre v Apand. These markets, and their associated systems of
regulation, have some very particular features. Callinan J noted, without
clarification or addition, that 'lilt is notorious that commodity markets are fragile
(as the evidence here indicates) and in particular are vulnerable in modem times
to contamination both prospective and actual.'"
52 !bid 327 (Callinan J).
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One particular characteristic of these commodity markets is the regulatory
structure that supports them. It is a regulatory structure that has to work around
two sets of concerns. 53 The first set is that identified by Callinan J and relates to
what may generally be described as contamination of product, by disease or
chemical agents. In Perre v Apand the potatoes grown by the Sparnons with the
seed provided by Apand were affected by bacterial wilt. The second set relates to
the structure of the agricultural industry. This industry is, for the most part, made
up of a large number of broadly spread producers that are dispersed through the
many regions in Australia.
The regulatory structure supporting agricultural commodity markets is a form
of national regulation. Although each State has a separate body of legislation
regulating these markets the content of each State's legislation is roughly
comparable. In addition the overall impact of each state's regulatory scheme is to
produce a pattern of complementary regulation covering broadly similar subject
matter. The following description of the system of regulation uses New South
Wales as an example of the kind of regulation which the States use to regulate
agricultural commodity markets.
The system of regulation is a distinctive form of command and control
regulation with 'steep sides'.54It is a system of regulation that deals extensively
with the labelling and certification of seeds,55 artificial breeding,56 genetic
modification of organisms," the use of fertilisers,58 rights to use water," the use
of water catchment areas, soil conservation,60 the use of medicines,61
pesticides,62 and stock food63 In addition there are schemes of regulation dealing
with travelling stock,64 the removal of weeds,65 plant diseases,66 and stock
diseases." This is the context for the schemes regulating the growing of potatoes
53 For a review of the global system of regulation of food, see John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global
Business Regulation (2000) 399-417. The authors argue that the era of regulation of food by central
states lasted less than a century and is now subject to international institutions and structures: at 400. The
focus in this article on regulation is not so much concerned with the source of standards for the quality
and safety offaad as it is with the regulatory structure that is designed to achieve the standards.
54 For a further explanation of the meaning of 'steep sides' see below nn 81-2 and accompanying text.
55 Seeds Act 1982 (NSW) s 5 deals with the labelling of seeds; pt 4 sets up Varietal Verification Schemes
that regulate the growing of, and the certification of, specified varieties of seeds. This failure to use
certified potato seed by Apand was a central part of the reasoning used by the High Court to affirm that
Apand was subject to a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the Perre interests sustaining pure
economic loss.
56 Stock (Artificial Breeding) Act 1985 (NSW).
57 Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth).
58 Fertilisers Act 1985 (NSW).
59 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).
60 Soil Conservation Act 1938 (NS\V).
61 Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Code Act 1994 (Cth); Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals
(Administration) Act 1992 (Cth).
62 Pesticides Act 1999 (Cth).
63 Stock Foods Act 1940 (NSW).
64 Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 (NSW), pts 8 and 9.
65 Noxious Weeds Act 1993 (NSW); Seeds Act 1982 (NSW)
66 Planl Diseases Act 1924 (NSW).
67 Stock Diseases Act 1923 (NSW): Exotic Diseases ofAnimals Act 1991 (NSW)
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and the management of the presence of bacterial wilt in potatoes - the basic
subject matter of the dispute in Perre v Apand.
The directives produced by this system of regulation of commodity markets
are highly prescriptive and clearly supported by criminal sanctions. For example,
the Seeds Act 1982 (NSW) ('Seeds Act') deals with the labelling of seeds.
Amongst other things, this requires that a parcel of seeds have a label which
states the botanical name of the seed, the mass or number of seeds, the brand
which identifies the source of the seeds and the name of any chemical applied to
the seed to prevent pests or disease. If the parcel contains a declared weed, the
label must state the maximum allowable number of seeds (of the declared weed)
per kilogram of the seed.68 In addition Part 4 ofthe Seeds Act allows the Minister
to establish Varietal Verification Schemes, which are comprehensive and
intrusive in relation to the activities of participants. The Plant Diseases Act 1924
(NSW) (,Plant Diseases Act'), amongst other things, prohibits the introduction
of things likely to introduce a disease or pest, and makes provision for the
treatment and eradication of pests and diseases.69 The Pesticides Act 1999 (Cth)
('Pesticides Act') similarly deals with the wilful or negligent misuse of
pesticides,70 and extends to a prohibition of such activities as the possession of
an unregistered pesticide,'l or the keeping of a pesticide in a container without
an approved label." The Pesticides Act even extends to making it an offence to
fail to read an approved labeL"
The sanctions specified for breach of these and other provisions are not the
most significant feature of these systems of regulation. It is the procedures used
to minimise the impact of the spread of impurities, pesticides, disease and pests
that create what are known as the 'steep sides' of the markets formed around
these systems of regulation. These mechanisms include the establishment of
quarantine areas, the right to make orders to take steps to eradicate or control a
pest or disease, restrictions on the movements of stock and seeds, and
restrictions on the right to sell stock or other commodities.
The Plant Diseases Act allows the Minister for Agriculture to make an order
to an appropriate person for the purpose of treating or eradicating diseases and
pests.74 The Minister may declare a specified area to be a quarantine area.75
Owners of quarantined land may then be subj ect to specific orders with respect
to the grading, packing, branding and labelling of fruit, vegetables or other
plants.76 Further, the Minister may authorise an inspector to enter land and carry
out work specified in the order for the purpose of prevention of any pest or
68 Seeds Act 1982 (NSW) s 5; Seeds Regulation 1994 (NSW) reg 10 and 5ch 1 'Declared Weeds', The
maximum penalty for breach of this provision is 20 penalty units.
69 Plant Diseases Acl 1924 (NSW) ss 4, SA.
70 Pesticides Act /999 (Cth) div 1.
71 Pesticides Act 1999 (Cth) s 12. The maximum penalty is A$60 000 for an individual.
72 Pesticides Act 1999 (Cth) s 16. The maximum penalty is A$l 0 ODD for an individuaL
73 Pesticides Act 1999 (Cth) s 14. The maximum penalty is A$60 000 for an individual.
74 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) S SA,
75 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) S 6.
76 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) S 28A.
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disease." Where there is non-compliance with an order by the Minister, or an
inspector appointed under the Plant Diseases Act, the Minister is entitled to
recover expenses associated with completion of the work by an inspector. 78
The most extreme example of these procedures is the power granted to the
Minister, under the Exotic Diseases of Animals Act 1991 (NSW), to make a
declaration of an 'infected place'. The effect of such a declaration is that a
person is not permitted to enter or leave an infected place without authorisation
by way of a permit." Further the Minister may proceed to make a 'destruction
order' for any domestic animal, which the Minister reasonably believes to be
infected by an exotic disease.8o
These broad schemes of regulation have 'steep sides' in the sense that it is
easy for a landowner or other related person, for example the owner of a vehicle,
to fall out of the market into a 'quarantined', non-market area. Wbere this
happens the risks associated with the removal of access to the market are
imposed on the landowner or other person. 81 The primary loss sustained by
landowners in these circumstances will be loss of opportunity to sell or deal with
the fruit, vegetable or stock.82 As specified above, there may also be provisions
for ensuring that the landowner bears the costs associated with the eradication or
prevention of the pest or disease. It is quite likely that a landowner or other
person may be subject to quarantine, or a similar order in circumstances where
they are not personally responsible for the presence of the disease or pest.
In general terms the broad scheme of agricultural regulation is premised on
relationships between strangers who have the capacity to adversely affect each
other's access to commodity markets. This means that it is possible for any
person in any industry to lose access to a market because of the activities of a
person with whom they have no direct or indirect relationships. For example, the
presence of pesticides in some small amounts of beef sold to the United States
created the possibility that Australian beef farmers would lose all access to the
United States market. The rationale supporting this broad scheme of regulation is
that in order to protect the existence of a market it is preferable to act to deny all
access to the relevant market for any producer who is, or who may be likely to
be, affected by the presence of the relevant disease, pest or chemical.
Overall, this scheme of regulation of relationships between strangers has a
number of important characteristics. The risk of loss of access to markets,
associated with the presence of pests, diseases, or chemical residues, is imposed
77 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NS\\') s 13A.
78 Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NS\\') s 16.
79 Exotic Diseases ofAnimals Act 199J (NSW) ss 10, 12.
80 Exotic Diseases ofAnimals Act 1991 (NSW) ss 32-4.
81 Exotic Diseases ofAnimals Act 1991 (NSW) s 25 (prohibits a person from seeking compensation for the
acts of an inspector, unless the acts of the inspector are wilful or negligent). An exception to this general
proposition is Exotic Diseases of Animals Act 1991 (NSW) pt 7, which provides for payment of
compensation for animals destroyed pursuant to the Act. Note however that s 60 prevents recovery for
loss ofprofit. loss of production or other consequential loss.
82 See, eg, Stock (Chemical Residues) Act 1975 (Cth). Section 8 empowers the Minister to issue a detention
notice to a person in charge of chemically affected stock. Section 11 empowers the Minister to make an
order for the destruction of certain chemically affected stock.
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on landowners and other market participants. As a result it is landowners and
other market participants who are responsible for managing this risk. This
applies not only to ensuring compliance with regulatory measures but also to the
problem of managing the risks associated with the loss of a market. Thus
landowners and others will have to be attuned to a variety of strategies for
managing the risk of loss of access to particular markets. This may involve the
purchase of insurance, the possibility of accessing different markets or the
possibility of changing the products being grown and marketed.83
E Is There Space for Negligence to Occupy?
The above analysis of the systems regulating agricultural commodity markets
suggests that one of the goals of this body of regulation is to encourage the
development of risk management strategies by all market participants. The clear
signal that landowners, service providers and other intermediaries bear the risk
of loss of access to markets associated with the presence of pests, diseases or
chemical residues is designed to encourage a better analysis of the risks
associated with regulatory non-compliance. Any attempt to broadly reallocate
the risk of harm arising out of non-compliance would therefore cut across an
existing, well-developed regulatory structure. In this sense the scheme of
regulation will not create space for the tort of negligence to occupy.84
These schemes of regulation do more than regulate relationships between
people who are strangers except for their participation in particular markets. The
declaration of quarantine areas, associated with the presence of pests, diseases or
chemical residues, creates relationships of mutual interdependence. A person
may lose all access to a market because of the actions of a stranger. However, a
person can also lose access to a market, due to the declaration of a quarantine
area, as a result of the actions of a person who understands the consequence that
may follow a decision not to comply with a particular regulatory requirement.
Regulatory non-compliance resulting in the declaration of a quarantine notice
will form the basis for a relationship of mutual interdependence where two
conditions are met. First, where a person makes a decision not to comply with a
particular regulatory requirement in circumstances where that person knows that
a particular person or class of person may suffer loss as a result of their non-
compliance. Secondly, where that person's neighbours have the expectation that
they will not be exposed to a risk of loss by regulatory non-compliance. It is the
very 'fragility' of agricultural commodity markets which produces this
expectation.ss It is this relationship of mutual interdependence that is formed in
83 One of the potential sources of weakness in this form of regulation is the process for assessment of
complex risks of harm that are associated with new agricultural practices that may pose significant risks
of harm to public health, the environment and industry. Where regulators fail to assess the nature and
extent of these complex risks this may produce massively important instances of regulatory failure, see,
eg, Gavin Little, 'Reports: BSE and the Regulation of Risk' (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 730.
84 In the language of the tort of negligence, the creation of liability in these circumstances would create the
problem of indeterminate liability.
85 Above n 52.
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the context of the scheme of regulation that creates space for the tort of
negligence.
In Donoghue v Stevenson the law of contract created the space for the creation
of relationships of mutual interdependence between the manufacturer and the
ultimate consumer. In a similar fashion, in agricultural commodity markets the
declaration of quarantine areas creates relationships of mutual interdependence
between some market participants. As in Donoghue v Stevenson it is the
presence of relationships of mutual interdependence that is indicative of space
that the tort of negligence may occupy.
The circurru;tances in Perre v Apand are just such an instance where the
system of regulation produces a particular relationship of mutual
interdependence. The 'salient features' identified by each of the justices indicate
that Apand made a commercial decision to expose the Perre interests to the risk
of harm created by the use of uncertified seed. This commercial decision
exposed the Perre interests to a determinate risk of harm which could have been
avoided had Apand used certified seed. The specific risk of harm to which the
Perre interests were exposed included the loss of the lucrative Western
Australian market for crisping potatoes.8•
The particular approaches used by each of the justices to decide upon the
existence of a duty of care were different. Each judge focused on a similar range
of 'salient features' in deciding upon the existence of a duty of care, indicating
that the justices were using similar tools to decide whether there was space for
the tort of negligence to occupy. Independent of their broad approach to the duty .
of care, the justices used the ambiguity inherent in the principles defining the
reach of the duty of care to explore the question of whether the complex
relationship between the parties in Perre v Apand could support the existence of
a duty of care.
F Should Negligence Occupy the Space?
The second set of issues for a synergistic model of tort law is concerned with
the question of whether tort law should recognise the existence of a duty of care
and occupy the space created by the system regulating agricultural commodity
markets. There are two separate sets of concerns for courts deciding whether to
recognise the existence of a duty of care. The first deals with whether the
recognition of the duty of care enhances the internal coherence of tort law. The
second deals with the question of whether the recognition of a duty of care
enhances the goals and policies of the external system of regulation.
The decision in Perre v Apand fell within an accepted category of recovery
for pure economic loss. The High Court was not asked to reconsider its decision
in Caltex Oil (Australasia) Ply Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad ('Callex Oil'),87
86 Perr. v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 194-5 (Glee,on Cl), 202 (Gaudron I), 236 (McHugh I), 258
(Gummow J), 289 (Kirby I), 307 (H.yne I), 327 (C.llinan J).
87 Cal/ex Oil (Australasia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge Willemstad (1976) 136 CLR 529. See ibid 250-1
(Gummow 1).
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however the decision in Caltex Oil was affirmed by all of the justices.88 The one
issue of principle that was raised in Perre v Apand was whether it was possible
to recognise a duty of care to prevent pure economic loss in relation to a duty
owed to a determinate class rather than specific individual plaintiffs. The
members of the Court had little difficulty in finding that it was possible to
recognise a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent a determinate class of
plaintiffs sustaining pure economic loss.89 This was however a relatively
unimportant aspect of the decision.
The second issue was a critical part of the decision to recognise the existence
of a duty of care in Perre v Apand. This involved an analysis of whether the
recognition of a duty of care would enhance or detract from the capacity of the
scheme of regulation to achieve its goals and objectives. This scheme of
regulation dealt with the allocation of the risk of loss of access to markets caused
by the presence of pests, diseases or unwanted chemical residues. An important
goal of this scheme of regulation was to allocate these risks between persons
who were, apart from their participation in the relevant markets, strangers. The
recognition of a duty of care in Perre v Apand did not interfere with the
allocation of these risks. The existence of a close relationship of mutual
interdependence such as that between the Perre interests and Apand meant that
the underlying rationale for the allocation of risk by the regulatory scheme was
inapplicable. In this sense the recognition of the duty of care did not cut across
the goals of this system of regulation.
In Perre v Apand the relationship of mutual interdependence between the
Perre interests and Apand was formed around the Western Australian regulation
which prohibited the import of potatoes grown and processed by the Perre
interests.9o In deciding whether the recognition of the duty of care enhances the
objects of the broadly defined scheme of regulation it is not necessary to
distinguish between the effect of the Western Australian or equivalent South
Australian legislation. It is not necessary to show that the duty of care enhances
the South Australian rather than the Western Australian legislation. There are
two reasons for this.
The pattern of regulation created by State legislation (and where relevant
Commonwealth legislation) in effect operates as a national system ofregulation.
Each State and the Commonwealth regulate roughly comparable activities in
roughly comparable ways. For example, the Fruit and Plant Protection Act 1968
(SA) prohibited the import of fruit and plants affected by disease. This
legislation also empowered the Minister for Agriculture to proclaim quarantine
areas which imposed restrictions on the movement or sale or potatoes affected by
88 PerTe v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 192 (Glee,on CJ), 198-9 (Gaudron J), 204, 223 (McHugb J), 250-
1 (Gwurnow J), 281-3 (Kirby J), 304 (Hayne J), 316-322 (Callinan J).
89 !bid 202 (Gaudwn J), 222 (McHugb J), 254 (Gwurnow J), 286-7, 289 (Kirby J), 304-5 (Hayne J), 322-3
(Callinan J).
90 Above n 45.
638 UNSWLaw Journol Volume 25(3)
bacterial wilt.91 In this context it does not matter whether the recognition of the
duty of care enhances the Western Australian legislation rather than the South
Australian legislation. By enhancing the operation of the Western Australian
legislation the tort of negligence in effect supports a national regulatory matrix.
Secondly, it is artificial in the context of agricultural commodity markets to
distinguish between regulation in the market of destination and regulation in the
place where the product is produced. The relevant criterion from the perspective
of those producing and marketing agricultural commodities is whether there is
any applicable regulation dealing with pests, disease or chemical residues. The
national and international markets for agricultural products are best seen as the
combined operation of the regulatory systems governing the growing and
marketing of these products. When considering the impact of the recognition of
the duty of care the focus will be on whether this recognition will enhance the
particular scheme of regulation affecting the particular product. This will not be
limited to the regulatory scheme where the relevant products are produced or to
the place where the plaintiff chooses to bring their cause of action against the
defendant.
In addition to the consideration of whether the recognition of the duty of care
cut across the goals of the regulatory scheme there are two specific indications
that the duty of care actually complemented the scheme of regulation. First, there
is no indication that the sanctions for non-compliance with restrictions on the
movement or sale of potatoes affected by bacterial wilt were intended to be the
only mechanism for limiting the spread of diseases such as bacterial wilt. Indeed
it appears that recognition of a duty of care where a person has foresight that
their non-compliance will cause damage to a particular class of persons could be
the basis for a remedy that would encourage regulatory compliance.
Furthermore, recognition of a duty of care in Perre v Apand would encourage
market participants to develop better systems of risk management. It was always
open to Apand to disclose their intention to carry on the experiment on the
Sparnons' farm. If they had done so they would have been in a position to
bargain with the Perre interests about who should bear the costs associated with
the risk of the appearance of bacterial wilt on the Sparnons' farm.'2
Finally, a goal of the broad system of regulation of agricultural product
markets was to encourage development of awareness of the high degree of
interdependence between people who were strangers apart from their
91 Fruit and Plant Protection Act 1968 (SA) s 4(1), (7). Bacterial wilt of potatoes was added to the list of
proclaimed diseases on 1 October 1990. This Act was repealed by the Fruit and Plant Protection Act
1992 (SA), which commenced operation on 1 February 1993. It included a comparable provision
prohibiting the import of potatoes affected by bacterial wilt: 5 13(2). Section 14 of the 1992 Act
empowered the Minister to issue a quarantine notice restricting the removal of specified products from a
given area. Bacterial wilt of potatoes was also proclaimed as a disease under this Act. Unlike the
equivalent Western Australian legislation the South Australian provision required the issue of a notice by
the Minister to initiate the creation of quarantine areas. The Plant Diseases Regulations 1989 (WA),
r 4(1), sch 1, pt B, item 14(1)(b) had the effect of automatically imposing a quarantine area around the
Sparnons' fann, that is, this provision automatically prevented the importation into Western Australia of
potatoes grown or processed within 20 kilometres of the Spamons' fann.
92 For an example of this fonn ofanalysis, see Partlett, above n 38, 75-7.
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participation in particular markets. The recognition of a duty of care in Perre v
Apand reinforced the sigriificance of the relationship of interdependence
between Apand and the Perre interests. This included Apand' s knowledge about
the risk of harm associated with their use of uncertified seed and the reasonable
expectation of the Perre interests that they would not be exposed to this risk
without their knowledge or consent. The recognition of the existence of this'
relationship of mutual interdependence was in this sense consistent with the
broad goals of the regulatory system.
While the High Court in Perre v Apand did not directly address the issue of
whether the recognition of the duty of care was consistent with the scheme of
regulation, the Court did address this issue indirectly in a number of ways.
Firstly, each of the judges argued that the recognition of a duty of care did not
create the potential for indeterminate liability.93 The acknowledgement that the
duty of care would impose a determinate level of liability on the defendant was
bound up in the recognition by the Court that the Perre interests and Apand were
in a mutually interdependent relationship that resulted from the decisions of
Apand.94
In addition, different members of the Court identified different considerations,
the effect of which was to suggest that the recognition of the duty of care would
enhance the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme. Several justices stated that
the recognition of a duty of care would not limit the autonomy of defeodant to
engage in legitimate commercial activity. This was because the act of bringing
diseased potatoes into South Australia was prohibited by statute.95 Gaudron J
made a similar point by focusing on the right of the Perre interests to sell
potatoes in Western Australia provided they met the standards set for that
market.% Finally, Gummow J argued that the recognition of a duty of care would
not 'cut across a well developed body of doctrine which already applied' .97
It is therefore possible to argue that the decision in Perre v Apand did not
involve the imposition of a duty of care on the defendant. Rather, the regulatory
system created a relationship of mutual interdependence that created space for
the tort of negligence to occupy. The recognition of the duty of care was
ultimately referable to the principle that it enhanced the goals and objectives of
tbe scheme regulating agricultural commodity markets.
IV WHAT MAYBE ACHIEVED WITH TORT LAW REFORM
The synergistic model of the interaction between tort law and regulation is a
priocipled response to the 'negligence as social welfare' argumeot developed by,
93 Pen-e v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, 195 (G1eeson Cl), 202 (Gaudron 1), 234 (McHugh I), 258
(Gummow 1),290 (Kirby 1),304-5 (Hayne 1), 326-7 (Callinan 1).
94 Ibid 202 (Gaudron 1), 226, 235 (McHugh 1), 256-8 (Gummow 1), 289, 290-1 (Kirby 1), 305-7 (Hayne
1),328,330-1 (Callinan I).
95 Ibid 235 (McHugh I), 261 (Gummow 1), 290 (Kirby 1), 307 (Hayne 1),328,330 (Callinan 1).
96 !bid 201-2 (Gaudron 1).
97 Ibid 253 (Gummow J).
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amongst others, Chief Justice Spigelman.98 This argument is one that sees tort
law as an independent body of law expanding through the community and
imposing on community members particular standards of distributive justice. As
these standards of distributive justice are the outcome of decisions by courts and
not parliaments they are regarded as illegitimate.
By contrast I have argued that the tort of negligence, far from being an
independent actor in the legal system, facilitates the public policy choices that
are embedded in the areas of regulatory law with which the tort of negligence
interacts. In this sense the tort of negligence and regulatory law are in a
synergistic rather than an antagonistic relationship. This model of negligence
provides a framework defining the reach and scope of the tort of negligence. It
makes better sense of the rules and principles that defme this tort than the
generally accepted one-dimensional model. There are two important
consequences which flow from adopting a synergistic model of the interaction
between tort law and regulation.
The first is that the perceived 'imperialistic' expansion of negligence is not
the result of a failure of courts to impose sufficient controls on the neighbour
principle. Rather, it is a function of the ever-widening attempts to use complex
forms of regulation to achieve particular public policy outcomes. This broad
social, political and economic process is evident in the field of health care,
occupational health and safety, environmental regulation and financial services
regulation. A synergistic model of tort law suggests that the expanded coverage
of the tort of negligence will be an incidental consequence of the creation by
those systems of regulation of spaces where the tort can apply.
A second consequence of the synergistic model of the interaction between
negligence and regulation is simple but arguably crucial to the current debate
about tort law reform. The argument that the tort of negligence and regulation
function synergistically is not an argument that all regulatory systems function
effectively. Nor is it an argument that the tort of negligence, or other rights to
claim compensation for loss, are effectively integrated into schemes of
regulation. Rather it is an argument that the insurance crisis, and perceptions
about the arbitrariness and unpredictability of negligence, should be regarded as
evidence of regulatory failure, and not treated as a failure of a particular,
severable body of law, that is, tort law. Any failings of tort law in the cases
should be regarded as evidence that failures within the broader regulatory
framework have left tort law with either too much or too little work to do.
This is the crucial contribution that a synergistic model of the interaction
between tort and regulation can make to the current debate on tort law reform.
The current crisis is an opportunity to consider the whole matrix of laws and
practices which 'regulate' particular fields of activity. Following such an
evaluation, it is possible to begin the process of designing and implementing
more effective systems of regulation of these activities. This approach is clearly
applicable to the current 'hot spots', the regulation the delivery of health care
services and broadly defined recreational activities. It is also an opportunity to
98 Spigelman, above n 2.
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integrate the right to claim damages in tort, or a more tailored form of right to
claim compensation, into more effective regulatory structures.
This may appear to be too broad and diffuse an approach to the current
crisis.99 It may be thought that this is a medium or even long-term goal, which
does not address the current crisis. In my submission though, failure to recognise
the greater context and the interrelation of regulatory systems and tort law will
mean that the causes of that crisis will not be fully addressed and the problems
will remain to reappear in the future.
In the following section I shall highlight the inherent problems with the
current approach to tort law reform. I shall also show how the broader regulatory
perspective opens up a range of options for this reform that do not appear to be a
part of the current reform agenda.
A Current Proposals for Reform
Many proposals for the reform of tort law have been canvassed in the Review
of the Law ofNegligence Final Report ('Ipp Report')IOO In this article I do not
intend to address all of these proposals or attempt to deal with the full range of
issues raised in the Ipp Report. Rather I focus on one set of proposals that are
generally concerned with the 'self-assumption' of risk. In analysing this set of
proposals I have two goals. First, that the response to the insurance crisis should
be regulatory reform and not tort law reform. Second, that tort law reform is
nonetheless a good starting point for· encouraging the pursuit of regulatory
reform.
The Terms of Reference for the Review of the Law of Negligence specified
that the Panel of Eminent Persons was required to 'develop and evaluate
proposals to allow self-assumption of risk to override common law principles' .101
In particular, the Panel was asked to consider the proposals included in the Trade
Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002 (Cth)
('Liability for Recreational Services Bill'), that are designed to allow self-
assumption of risk. Many of the recommendations of the Ipp Report have also
been implemented in the Civil Liability Amendment (personal Responsibility)
Bill 2002 (NSW).102
The Liability for Recreational Services Bill, the Civil Liability Amendment
(Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW) and the Ipp Report are examples of
reliance on a one-dimensional model as the basis for proposing reform of tort
law. All three assume that the reform of tort law can be considered and
implemented without reference to broader regulatory concerns. Each is an
emanation of the more general view that the way to fix the insurance crisis is to
reduce both the incidence of liability in tort and related causes of action and the
99 Panel of Eminent Persons, above n 1, [1.17] (risk management and regulation being outside the scope of
the Panel's Terms of Reference).
100 Ibid.
101 'Tenns of Reference: Principles-Based Review of the Law of Negligence', Panel of Eminent Persons,
above nI, ix-xi, 3(b).
102 See, eg, Civil Liability Amendment (personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW) div 4 ('Assumption of
Risk'), div 5 ('Recreational Activities').
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quantum of any damages awarded where a defendant is found to be responsible
for the plaintiffs injuries.
B Recreational Services
The Ipp Report recommends that: 'The Provider of a recreational service is
not liable for personal injury or death suffered by a voluntary participant in a
recreational activity as result of the materialisation of an obvious risk'.IO'
The central proposal in the Liability for Recreational Services Bill allows
those supplying 'recreational services' to contract out of the implied warranties
found in s 74 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ('TPA').I04 The warranties
implied into contracts for the supply of services in s 74(1) specify that the
services 'will be rendered with due care and skill'. 'Recreational services' are
defined very broadly in the proposed s 68B(2) to include, amongst other things,
'services that consist of participation in a sporting activity or similar leisure-time
activity pursuits' . The Explanatory Memorandum for the Liability for
Recreational Services Bill indicates that the amendment will 'permit self-
assumption of risk by individuals who choose to participate in inherently risky
activities'105 The Second Reading Speech states that the Bill aims to 'achieve a
balance between protecting consumers and allowing them to take responsibility
for themselves' .106
The Final Report of the Review of the Law ofNegligence recommended that a
proposed act embody the principle that' a provider of a recreational service is not
liable for personal injury or death suffered by voluntary participation in a
recreational activity as a result of the materialisation of an obvious risk' .107 The
Liability for Recreational Services Bill includes a provision allowing for
exclusion of warranties that would otherwise be included in contracts for the
provision of recreational services. By contrast, the Ipp Report recommends that
there be an exclusion ofliability in relation to 'obvious' risks. However, both the
Ipp Report and the Liability for Recreational Services Bill share the goal of
allowing participants in recreational services to take a form of personal
responsibility. The Ipp Report proposal is one that allows for persons
103 Panel of Eminent Persons, above n 1 (Recommendations 11 and 12). These recommendations are
reproduced in the Civil Liability Amendment (personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW) div 4
('Assumption of Risk').
104 Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW), proposed s 5N ('Waiver of
Contractual Duty of Care for Recreational Activities ').
105 Explanatory Memorandwn, Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002
(Cth) 4.
106 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 August 2002, 3671 (Senator Richard Alston).
107 Panel of Eminent Persons, above n 1,3 (Recommendation 10). An 'obvious risk' is a risk that 'in the
circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the participant':
Recommendation 10.
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participating in 'recreational activities' to take responsibility for risks that are
'obvious' to 'a reasonable person in the participant's position' .108
These proposals are written as if tort law reform were the only, or even the
main, method for reaching an appropriate balance between consumer protection
and personal responsibility. This is an instance of what I have described in this
article as one-dimensional, and flawed, analysis of tort law. It is an
oversimplification to assume that it is possible to remould a complex concept
such as 'personal responsibility' by reforming one category of law without
reference to the interaction between tort law and other bodies of law.
1 The Cost ofWaiver ofLegal Rights
There are number of other bodies of law, practice and regulation which
significantly mould our understanding of 'personal responsibility' in relation to
the activities covered by the proposals for reform noted above. On the most basic
level it is doubtful that the Liability for Recreational Services Bill will allow
those participating in recreational activities 'to decide whether or not to accept
the risks involved' .109
One of the elements of any decision to waive a valuable legal right is the cost
to the person deciding to waive the right. Neither the Liability for Recreational
Services Bill, nor the Ipp Report appears to deal with this issue. There is as yet
no empirical study indicating whether there is any market for first party
insurance products, such as income protection, or accident and trauma, insurance
for those participating in 'recreational activities'. This is fundamental to a
person's decision to waive their legal rights because the cost of these policies
provides the best marker of the price to the individual of waiving those rights. If
there were no market, which is most likely to be the case for some 'inherently
risky' activities, then there is a strong case for suggesting that the reform
package should set up a process for creating such a market. Without the
availability of these first party insurance products it is not at all clear that
consumers are making informed decisions about accepting 'personal
responsibility' .
2 WaiverofLegaIRightsasa'Subsidy'
The question of whether there is a real decision to waive these valuable legal
rights is also affected by another major body of regulation. As is well known,
damages in tort law are designed to compensate the plaintiff for the damage
sustained as the result of the negligence of another. 110 There are three generally
accepted heads' of damages. The first relates to compensation for an existing
capacity that is lost. This head of damage is usually measured by reference to the
108 Ibid 49. Recommendation 14 provides that no warning need be given in relation to 'obvious risks',
Unlike Recommendation 11, this applies outside of the context of the provision of recreational services:
at 53-5. The definition of 'recreational services' in Recommendation 12 is narrower than that proposed
in the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002 (Cth).
109 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, above n 106.
110 Mahony v J Kruschich (Demolitions) Pty Lld (1985) 156 CLR 522.
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extent to which the plaintiffs income-earning capacity is reduced as a result of
the injury. The second head of damage is for needs created by the personal
injury. Under this head the plaintiff will recover the cost of the full range of
medical, nursing and ambulance services that the plaintiff will need to be able to
recover, as far as is possible, from the injury. The third head of damages is
referred to as non-pecuniary harm, pain and suffering or general damages.!1l
The Public Liability Insurance Report, which was prepared for the ministerial
meeting on 27 March 2002, reviewed the proportions attributable to these three
heads of damages out of the total amount of damages awarded to plaintiffs
claiming compensation for personal injury. Where the total amount of damages
was under A$20 000 the first two heads of damages accounted for 13 per cent of
the total amount of damages.!!2 Where the total amount of damages was between
A$20 000 and A$IOO 000, the first two heads of damages accounted for 44 per
cent of the total. 1I3 Where the total amount of damages was between A$IOO 000
and A$500 000, the first two heads of damages accounted for 69 per cent of the
total.1l4 Where total damages was above A$500 000, the first two heads of
damages accounted for 85 per cent of the total.!!5
These figures are crucial to understanding the nature of the decision made by
an individual about the waiver of their rights under s 74 of the TPA. The Health
and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) provides that a person who
receives compensation will be either prevented from accessing Medicare
benefits, or be required to reimburse the Health Insurance Commission for any
benefits obtained.1l6 The Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) provides that a person
who receives compensation for loss of earning capacity is subject to a 'lump sum
preclusion period'.117 Section 1163 sets out the central elements of Part 3.14,
which limits entitlement to certain 'compensation affected payments' where a
person receives a lump sum compensation payment.
The overall goal of these provisions is to ensure that defendants in tort actions
are responsible to the full extent possible for the cost of the damage sustained by
the plaintiff. The rationale for imposing these costs is that defendants will be
required to 'internalise' the cost of damages caused to the plaintiff by their
negligent conduct. The process of 'internalising' costs is designed to encourage
III Luntz and Hambly, above n 8, 544-5, see generally 535, ch 8 'Damages'.
112 Atkins, Pearson and Rose, above n 3, 19-20 (heads of damages as a proportion of total amount of
damages awarded by courts). The total cost of claims for personal injury and property damage in this
range was less than 20 per cent of the total cost of claims: at 17.
113 Ibid. The total cost of claims for personal injury and property damage in this range was 33 per cent of the
total cost ofclaims.
114 Ibid. The total cost of claims for personal injury and property damage in this range was 30 per cent of the
total cost of claims.
115 Ibid. The total cost of claims for personal injury and property damage in this range was 20 per cent of the
total cost of claims.
116 Health and Other Services (Compensation) Act 1995 (Cth) s 7. See also Luntz and Hambly, above n 8,
586.
117 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) pt 3.14. See generally Harold Luntz, 'The Collateral Source Rule Thirty
Years On' in Peter Cane and Jane Stapleton (oos), The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of
John Fleming (1998) 377.
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defendants to introduce economij:ally efficient practices to improve the safety of
activities, which they control and from which they can benefit.!18
This background renders the self-assumption of risk, whether by way of
waiver of warranties or by exclusion of liability, suspect for two reasons. First,
the self-assumption of risk in this context operates as a form of subsidy. The cost
of compensating injured plaintiffs is shifted from the providers of recreational
services to the Commonwealth government. There is a further subsidy insofar as
the self-assumption of risk has the effect of reducing levels of expenditure by
operators to prevent injuries occurring.!!9 The Financial Impact Statement
accompanying the Liability for Recreational Services Bill makes no reference to
this cost to the Commonwealth.!20
It is hard to see any justification for the provision of the subsidy in this form.
There does not appear to have been any serious analysis of why providers of
recreational services should receive a subsidy in this way - beyond the simple
point that the insurance crisis has a dramatic and disproportionate effect on these
groups.
There is a second important way in which this background to the award of
damages renders suspect the proposals to encourage self-assumption of risk. The
decision to assume responsibility for the risk is not made by the person who
bears ultimate responsibility for its cost. It is hard to see how a decision to
assume responsibility for risk by a consumer can be regarded as informed when
it is the Commonwealth who will bear a significant proportion of the cost of the
decision. This seems to be all the more apparent where the Commonwealth is
making strenuous attempts to control the rate of increase in the costs of
providing medical care.!2!
This analysis makes good the claim that notions of 'personal responsibility'
are embedded in the regulatory space in which recreational activities take place.
Tort law reform, without reference to the other laws and practices affecting the
relevant conduct, will be unprincipled and will produce anomalous
consequences. This is the problem at the heart of all simple tort law reform.
118 See generally Luntz and Hambly above n 8, 102-7; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,
First Submission to the Principles Based Review of the Law ofNegligence (2002) 8--11, Submission No
47, <http://www.revOfneg.treasury.gov.aulcontentlsubsJ0471StAccc.pdf.>at 15 November 2002.
119 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 118, 1&-22. The Trade Practices
Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002 (Cth) does not require service providers to
adopt approved risk management practices: see Department of the Parliamentary Library, Bills Digest No
122002-03, Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002 (2002) 6-7,
<http://www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubslbdl2002.03/03bdOI2.pdf> at 15 November 2002. See Senator
Helen Coonan, Minister for Revenue, 'Meeting Gives Tick to National Negligence Package' (Press
Release Cl 19/02, 15 November 2002), <http://assistant.treasurer.gov.aulatr/contentlpressreleasesl2002/l
19.asp?pf=1> at 21 November 2002. The Minister has foreshadowed a focus on 'risk management via
professional standards legislation'.
120 Explanatory Memorandum., Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 2002
(CIh) 2.
121 See. eg, Department of the Treasury, Intergenerationo! Report 2002-03, Budget Paper No 5 2002-03
(2002), <http://www.budget.gov.aul2002-03Ibp5IhtmVindex.html>at 15 November 2002.
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C Tort Law Reform Reconsidered
The claim that tort law reform, as currently proposed, is misconceived does
not mean that the current system of compensation is entirely rational or broadly
justifiable. There is good evidence that tort law alone is a very ineffective form
of command and control regulation. The requirement that defendants
'internalise' the full cost of accidents does not translate into an effective system
of regulation. For a range of reasons, including the lack of predictability of the
incidence of tort liability and the opaque messages sent to defendants by
individual negligence actions, the current system of regulation by tort law is
arguably ineffective. l22 There are good reasons for doubting whether the current
system of regulation and compensation does effectively balance the rights of
consumers and their personal responsibility.123
The current insurance crisis is a good opportunity for reform of the regulation
of many forms of activity which produce personal injury. However, this reform
should be complex and multidimensional. It will need to be complex insofar as a
process will have to be set up to determine which kinds of activities should be
subsidised from public funds to ensure that those activities can continue. In the
field of recreational services, for example, there may be a relevant difference
between services provided by community not-for-profit organisations and
services provided by commercial operators.
Equally importantly, the reform process will have to integrate two sets of
concerns which have often been treated separately until now. One set of
concerns is the regulation of activities themselves, for example health care
services or recreational services. Appropriate standards must be set for the
delivery of goods and services. The second set of concerns relates to defining the
right to claim compensation for loss or harm caused by failure to meet those
standards. Where the right to obtain compensation can be effectively integrated
into the broader pattern of regulation, it can have an important role in improving
the effectiveness of the system ofregulation.124
An alternative approach to the regulation of recreational services would be to
integrate rights to claim compensation with regulatory and institutional processes
that are designed to ensure delivery of acceptable service quality levels. The
standards for conducting activities by commercial operators and community
122 Parker. above nIl. See also Angus Corbett, 'A Reformulation of the Right to Recover Compensation for
Medically Related Injuries in the Tort of Negligence' (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 141, 143-5; Angus
Corbett, 'A Proposal for a More Responsive Approach to the Regulation of Corporate Governance'
(1995) 23 Federal Law Review 277, 301-5.
123 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, above n 106.
124 See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Enforceable Undertakings, Practice Note 69
(1999), <http://www.cpd.com.aulnewcorp/asic/pnlpn069.pdf> at 6 September 2002. Enforceable
undertakings may be accepted by the Commission under Australian Securities and Investment
Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 93A, 93AA. Paragraph 69.17 provides a list of the kind of undertakings
that ASIC may accept. The list includes an undertaking to pay damages 10 third parties, as well as
undertakings dealing with a broad range of explicitly regulatory matters. This is an example of the right
to recover compensation being integrated into a broader regulatory structure. See also Corbett, .A
Refonnulation of the Right to Recover Compensation', above n 122, 165-7; Corbett, .A Proposal for a
More Responsive Approach to the Regulation of Corporate Governance', above n 122,293-300.
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organisations would be determined by a process of negotiation which included
the operators, consumers and relevant government bodies. The right to obtain
compensation would be part of the process for setting and enforcing relevant
standards of conduct. The aim would be to ensure that the right to claim
compensation for harm operated consistently with community expectations and
with the expectations of those providing recreational services. 125
A further example of this kind of regulatory reform concerns the Ipp Report's
proposal in relation to the provision of information to patients by medical
practitioners. The Ipp Report has proposed that the obligation to provide
information be divided into two elements. The fIrst is called the 'proactive duty
to inform' and the second is the 'reactive duty to inform'. The proactive duty
requires the medical practitioner to provide such information 'as the reasonable
person in the patient's position would, in the circumstances, want to be given
before making a decision whether or not to undergo treatment' 126 This
obligation is tempered by the proviso that:
A medical practitioner does not breach the duty to inform by reason only of a failure
to give the patient information about a risk or other matter that would, in the
circumstances, have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the
patient. 127
Consideration of this issue should arguably be transformed into a process for
setting standards for professional conduct. As with other areas, for example the
regulation of fInancial services, this process would include not only the relevant
professions, but also consumers and government bodies. The right to obtain
compensation for losses caused by professional negligence could then be aligned
with the expectations of consumers, the professionals themselves and the broader
community.
D The Immediate Futnre of Tort Law Reform
The process for regulatory reform needs to be multidimensional in a further
important way. The kind of regulatory reform for which I have argued is a
process which will take place in the medium to long-term. There is still the
immediate problem of dealing with the existing insurance crisis. The goal of
self-regulation is to establish the framework within which the parties will
bargain and negotiate. The ultimate objective is for those negotiations to produce
outcomes that are in line with the relevant public policy outcomes. It is these
public policy outcomes which provide legitimacy to the overall system of
regulation. 128
This starting point provides an insight into the immediate steps which
governments should take to further regulatory reform. The goal of reform in the
short-term should be such as to give all of the parties an interest in the broader
125 For an analysis of a process to achieve this outcome, see Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 13, 54--100
('tripartism'). 'Tripartism is defined as a regulatory policy that fosters the participation of P[ublic]
I[nterest] G[roups] in the regulatory process': at 57.
126 Panel of Eminem Persons, above ni, 53 (Recommendation 7(b».
127 Ibid (Recommendation 7(d»).
128 Parker, above nIl, 31--61.
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process of regulatory reform. One way of achieving this is to ensure that costs of
supporting an effective system of insurance in the short-term are shared between
government and service providers. Any such costs incurred by the government in
supporting and maintaining effective insurance markets should then be disclosed
in a full and transparent way.
As I have argued,· the Liability for Recreational Services Bill includes a
hidden subsidy to providers of recreational services. 12• Unless the subsidies
necessary to support an effective market for insurance products are clearly
disclosed, there will be no incentive for those providing the subsidies to engage
in the process of regulatory reform. Each of the interested parties needs to have
an incentive to develop a fairer and more effective system of regulation.
One way of setting up these incentives for consumers, insurance providers and
governments is to ensure that the costs of maintaining effective insurance
markets are shared between the parties. For example, it may be justifiable for the
Commonwealth to bear some of the costs of compensating injured consumers of
recreational services. This will provide the Commonwealth with an incentive for
continuing with regulatory reform. This incentive will only be effective if
information about the subsidies is disclosed in a full and transparent way. Thus
cost-sharing and the disclosure of subsidies to insurance markets are mutually
reinforcing reforms.
There are many ways in which the Commonwealth could share the costs of
developing effective insurance markets in the short-term. These include
accepting responsibility for bearing particular costs associated with personal
injury, for example medical health care costs. In this way it would be possible to
reduce the size of the total amount of damages payable to plaintiffs. An
alternative form of cost-sharing may involve placing caps on the amounts
payable under contracts of indemnity insurance. Where the total amount of
damages is greater than the capped amount the extra amount could be paid by the
States and Commonwealth. Each proposal would be designed to ensure that the
Commonwealth, consumers and service providers had appropriate incentives to
engage in the long-term project of regulatory reform.
V CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this article is to outline a model of tort law which places
tort in its natural context: within the changing dynamics of the legal system. I
have argued that the expansion of the tort of negligence has been underpinned by
the implicit understanding that this tort facilitates the operation of complex
bodies of law regulating social, cultural and economic practices. This is a
synergistic model of tort law and regulation because it highlights the degree of
mutually reinforcing interdependence between tort law and regulation. This
model emphasises the strengths of tort law - particularly the significance of
'personal responsibility' arising out of relationships characterised by mutual
129 See above on 118-21 and accompanying text.
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interdependence where there are no other statutory or common law mechanisms
to do this. This model also emphasises that tort law is not the sole, or even
primary, forum. for working out a concept as complex as 'personal
responsibility'. The decision to recognise that one person owes a duty of care to
another ultimately depends on whether the recognition of that duty enhances the
goals of other bodies of law and regulation.
This synergistic model of tort law challenges the understanding of negligence
as a form of social welfare. That characterisation of negligence is wrong and
misleading. It is wrong because the tort of negligence is not capable of operating
independently on a frolic of its own. It is arguable that the expansion in the
coverage of negligence and the increasing number of compensation claims,
together reflect much broader changes in the legal system. Expectations that
those responsible for delivering goods and services will exercise higher
standards of care arise out of many areas of law, not just tort law.
The contention that tort is to be regarded as a form of social welfare is
misleading because it suggests that the problems encountered by many parts of
the community as a result of the insurance crisis can be resolved by tort law
reform. Neither the 'problems' nor the resolutions to these problems are solely,
or even primarily, tort related. For example, tort law reform will not address the
very real issues concerning the regulation of recreational services, or the delivery
of health care services. Nor will tort law reform deal with the problem of
sustaining the full range of community and not-far-profit organisations. These
activities are deeply embedded in legal and cultural practices and the problems
signalled by the presence of tort liability will need to be resolved with reference
to this broad range of considerations.
Tort law reform conceived without an understanding of this broader context
may achieve a number of other outcomes. It will adversely affect those who will
be prevented from claiming compensation for injuries because of the reform
proposals. This will be devastating for the small, but important, group of
catastrophically injured plaintiffs. Specific reforms, recommended by the [pp
Report and implemented in the Civil Liability Amendment (Personal
Responsibility) Bill 2002 (NSW), will provide unjustifiable government
subsidies to various groups, such as recreational service providers. It is likely
that, without significant investment in regulation, these service providers will
provide services of a lower quality than that which they currently provide.
Misguided tort law reform may increase the cost of health services to the
community, reduce the quality of some goods and services, and leave some of
those injured in a materially worse position than that which they currently
occupy.
Finally, tort law reform will, if it follows the path currently set out by the
federal and State governments, miss an opportunity to initiate informed
discussion about the most effective and efficient ways of regulating conduct that
may cause harm. More effective regulation does not mean imposing
unreasonable, bureaucratic restrictions on community groups and commercial
organisations. It does mean engaging in a process to assess the full extent of the
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costs of carrying on aclivllies that may cause harm. It also involves further
analysis ofwho should bear these costs.
